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Economics and Antitrust Enforcement: The Last
25 Years
LOUIS SILVIA
ABSTRACT Economics has reshaped antitrust enforcement over the last quarter
century. Its impact has been most dramatic in merger analysis, with the shift toward
unilateral effects theories and away from market concentration-related theories of
collusion. Progress on both the theoretical and empirical fronts has also changed
enforcement priors and competitive analyses concerning vertical restraints and
monopolization. Economists also have made valuable assessments of the effectiveness of
antitrust enforcement, though more work in this area is needed.
Key Words: Antitrust; Mergers; Horizontal Restraints; Vertical Restraints;
Monopolization.
JEL Classifications: L1, L4.
Introduction
Advances in economic theory and techniques plus new empirical findings
have reshaped antitrust over the last 25 years. Increases in quantitative data
and more computing power have also made feasible analyses previously
impossible or too costly. At the Federal Trade Commission, where I have
worked since 1980, the antitrust economist’s daily life has changed. Economists
have shifted to increasingly complex and mostly quantitative analyses and
away from review of company documents and the like, such tasks left
increasingly to attorneys. While many remain generalists, specialization among
antitrust economists has increased. Some have special skills in theoretical
modeling, others in applied econometrics, and still others have expertise in
certain enforcement areas such as intellectual property.
Here, I sketch out some major impacts of economics upon antitrust
enforcement and highlight issues meriting further attention. The following
section discusses the impact on merger analysis, the biggest area of federal
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antitrust enforcement. The next section looks at enforcement in the conduct
area, and the third section notes economists’ assessments of enforcement
outcomes. Some concluding observations close the paper.
Merger Analysis
The rise of unilateral effects theories is the big story here. The issuing of the 1992
Department of Justice/FTC Merger Guidelines was a landmark event (US
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1992). They articulated
unilateral theories of harm based on “localized competition.” Diversion rates
and margins – not market shares and concentration – are the key elements in
these theories. The 1982 and 1984 editions of the Guidelines, by contrast, almost
exclusively focused on collusion, where changes in concentration were the
foundational element (US Department of Justice 1982, 1984). The 1992 Guidelines
were harbinger of things to come: the 2010 Guidelines treated unilateral theories
more extensively and extended them to new settings, including auction markets,
innovation, product variety, and homogeneous products. Though not discarded
by the 2010 Guidelines, collusion had clearly lost prominence (US Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission 2010).
The 1990s saw a shift toward analyzing cases with unilateral theories,
either alone or together with collusion theories. Though collusion cases did not
altogether disappear, unilateral effects is today’s default setting. Unilateral
theories, not collusion as in the early 1990s and before, now underpin
competitive analyses of hospital mergers, long a staple of FTC merger work.
Unilateral effects analyses have also made inroads in mergers in homogenous
goods industries such as chemicals and refined petroleum products.
How did unilateral theories push collusion aside? One cause was the
declining hold of the structure–conduct–performance paradigm on the antitrust
mind. In part, this was due to the 1970s and 1980s critiques of cross-sectional
studies that supported the paradigm. Evidence on profit–concentration
relationships within a single industry from, say, natural experiments of local
markets with differing concentration was rarely available as case guides. To be
sure, Stigler’s (1964) classic treatment of the oligopoly problem gave theoretical
support for collusion due to merger-related increases in concentration. Yet,
recent theoretical and empirical work suggests that effects of mergers on
increasing the likelihood of coordination are complex and may be small, even
sometimes negative (see, e.g., Kuhn 2008).
The many in-depth investigations since the 1980s Guidelines also suggested
that the profit–concentration relationship was weaker that previously
supposed, at least at concentration levels typically seen. The factors of the then
frequently used collusion checklist (e.g., price transparency, lumpiness of sales)
also often pointed in different directions. The factors were difficult to weigh.
Case narratives that a merger would increase the likelihood of collusion (e.g.,
by the sudden emergence of customer allocation schemes) often had a fairy-
tale flavor.
Product differentiation also rested uneasily in the collusion-centered
Guidelines. Differentiation is theoretically ambiguous for likelihood of
collusion. Many antitrust analysts long considered it a negative factor.
Empirical studies of cartels conducted since the 1990s have supported this
view. Yet, the 1980s Guidelines observed that differentiation between merging
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firms could matter to the enforcement decisions in limited circumstances.
When structural presumptions had great weight, discussion not infrequently
occurred about the possible biases in HHI metrics due to differentiation. Those
who did not work in antitrust during the 1980s cannot appreciate the thinking
back then that went in to coming up with precise, “just right for Goldilocks”
concentration measures.
Shapiro (2010) has suggested that the old Guidelines mentality reflected a
bygone age when basic industrial commodities dominated the economy. No
doubt, differentiation has increased in many US markets, but Shapiro’s
conjecture may not be completely correct. Economists at the time – and the
original Guidelines themselves – recognized the fact of differentiation. The
1980s mentality was to think broadly about price outcomes. Differentiation was
a detail. Consistent with this mentality was a tendency back then of defining
relevant markets broadly. Mocking of Brown Shoe1 “submarkets” was not
uncommon, though some of those so indulging had reservations that there
might be some truth in the concept. The notions of “head to head competition”
and “localized effects” associated with the rise unilateral theories, on the other
hand, encouraged defining narrower markets (Pautler 2015). Those hoping to
draw inferences from historical patterns of agency enforcement as related to
concentration levels should take note: concentration measures depend on the
methodology and assumptions in defining relevant markets. Both have varied
across time and markets.
Leading antitrust analysts in the early 1990s also believed that the early
Guidelines did not sufficiently emphasize anticompetitive merger effects other
than collusion (Willig, Salop, and Scherer 1991). These concerns and the other
issues with the early Guidelines created an environment receptive to the game
theoretic developments of the 1980s. These developments extended standard
oligopoly models to merger analysis and to settings beyond single price
markets. These unilateral effects models made explicit the underlying
mechanism of price determination. They dealt much more satisfactorily with
differentiation. They had the bonus of directly integrating marginal cost
efficiencies into the analysis. Their key variables were generally measurable.
Advances in estimating techniques, the growing availability of data, and
increasing computer power made possible ever more useful measures. Though
there has been work to reinvigorate collusion analyses (see, e.g., Jayaratne and
Ordover 2014), its impact on antitrust practice has been limited compared to
developments on the unilateral effects side.
Many new analytical tools are associated with the rise of unilateral effects
analyses: various upward price pressure tests, a plethora of price increase
formulae, and merger simulations of widely varying complexity and data
requirements (see, e.g., Budzinski and Ruhmer 2009). Unilateral models have
also proved adaptable to industries with special institutional features (e.g.,
hospital pricing in the context of health insurer networks), to those with
unusual market conditions (e.g., binding capacity constraints), and to vertical
mergers. Recent work has extended models of price determination to account
for rivals’ reactions, multi-product firms, and departures from Nash conduct
assumptions (see, e.g., Jaffe and Weyl 2013).
Increased precision in predicting merger effects is the chief allure of these
new tools. They have become important additions to the antitrust toolbox and
increasingly prominent not only in agency decision making but also as
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relied-upon evidence in litigation. Yet, they sometimes face an uphill fight in
persuading enforcement decision makers when their inferences differ from
those of traditional methods, including those based on qualitative evidence
such as company documents or customer opinions. For some analysts and
decision makers, inferences from traditional analyses serve as a critical, if not
determinative, robustness check on the results coming from these new tools.
There are questions of course about whether the assumptions in these new
tools affect their predicative abilities. There has been much research on these
questions. Economists have examined possible biases due to demand system
assumptions (see, e.g., Crooke et al. 1999), or those resulting from
computational approaches (see, e.g., Knittel and Metaxoglou 2011). Other
researchers have used natural experiments to test demand systems
assumptions (Raval, Rosenbaum, and Wilson 2016). Others have studied how
firms respond to cost changes to identify appropriate demand structures
(Miller, Remer, and Sheu 2013). Still others have compared the predictions of
simulations to various ex post measures of merger outcomes (see, e.g., Garmon
forthcoming; Weinberg and Hosken 2013).
The price determination assumptions have long been controversial. Critics
say the models are deficient, being static and leaving out dynamic elements that
matter. Competitive regimes might change post merger, for example (Carlton
2010). Proponents argue that outcomes in these static models roughly
approximate those in whatever more complex dynamic games are really played.
In some actual cases, margins do appear to approximate simulation predictions
and simulations do a reasonable job in accurately back casting the effects from
historical events. However, these comforting observations may not always
occur. Peters (2006), for example, concluded that deviations from firm conduct
assumptions played an important role in the mismatch he found between
simulation predictions and actual post-merger prices in airline mergers.
The relation of non-price competition in current unilateral effects models is
similar to that of differentiation to the collusion theories of old Guidelines –
accounting for non-price competition seems important, but integrating it into the
analysis is not straightforward. Recent work suggests that including non-price
dimensions of competition significantly affects predictions (see, e.g., Tenn, Froeb,
and Tschantz 2010). Needed work in this area would include more study of post-
merger “repositioning” by the merging firms (see, e.g., Ghandi et al. 2008), actual
rival re-positioning, and the stability of diversion rates generally.
Sampling and measurement error also matter to predictions. Measurement
errors will vary from case to case depending on data quality. One possibly
systematic error is in the measuring of margins. This topic has not received as
much attention as it deserves. Antitrust enforcers do have access to much
private data seldom available to academic researchers. This abundance does
not mean that any margin from firms’ accounting records is appropriate for
analysis. While accounting data may provide reasonable measures of short-run
incremental production costs under some circumstances, other elements
important to the relevant economic margins are less readily identified. These
include rent payments to past investments or to specialized factors (Baumann
and Godek 2011).
Predicted price increases should be robust to plausible alternative margin
interpretations. The main issues here are the appropriate length of run and the
treatment of the costs of non-price competition. Certainly, there should be
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consistency between diversion rates and margin assumptions. Costs other than
those associated short-run marginal costs are almost certainly important to
observed diversion rates. To illustrate, suppose gasoline Retailer A acquired
nearby Retailer B, and pre-merger diversion was 30%. In the US gasoline
retailing markets, gross margins, defined by the difference between retail and
wholesale gasoline prices, are about 10% of retail price. These numbers suggest
some modest upward price pressure. Yet, if A did not continue to incur costs
at B beyond paying for wholesale supply but abandoned all selling efforts, the
paying of taxes and utilities, and the costs of whatever amenities and facility
upgrades might attract customers to B, then the observed diversion would
certainly fall – and with it, the implied upward price pressure at A’s station
would fall. Retailer B presumably incurred such costs because this maximized
the present value of the firm over some time horizon. The combined firm’s
maximizing calculus could be different, but it is doubtful that it would involve
only short-run marginal costs.
1We leave this section by noting the broader impact of unilateral effects
theories upon antitrust analysis. Similar to plumbing upgrades in an old house,
changes in one area of antitrust analysis can have largely unforeseen effects
elsewhere. The rise of unilateral effects analyses led to revised thinking in defining
antitrust relevant markets (see, e.g., Katz and Shapiro 2003). It subsequently
resulted in a diminished role for traditional market definition in merger work.
Some antitrust scholars go further and advocate getting rid of market definition
altogether in economic analysis and focus directly on competitive effects (see, e.g.,
Kaplow 2011). This direct-to-competitive effects view may well affect antitrust
analysis outside of mergers, and there may be signs of this already.
Conduct Analysis
Economics’ effect on conduct enforcement over the last quarter century has
been multi-faceted and has come from progress on both the theoretical and
empirical fronts. For example, the economics of transactions costs and
externalities have increasingly guided conduct analyses. Models of multi-sided
platforms have emerged. These models have been used to analyze both
vertical and horizontal antitrust issues in many industries. Opportunistic hold-
up has become the foundation for anticompetitive concerns in a variety of
settings such as standard essential patents.
As for per se illegal horizontal agreements (e.g., price fixing, customer
allocation), economists’ studies of cartels over the last quarter century have
underscored the critical importance of enforcement directed toward price
fixing. These studies indicate durable, significant anticompetitive effects from
explicit price fixing, these effects being generally much greater than those
found in merger retrospectives (Langenfeld 2017). DOJ’s 1993 implementation
of its leniency program – guided by game theory – is a notable event that has
been generally regarded as significantly increasing the detection of price fixing.
Changes in economic analyses of non-per se illegal horizontal agreements
(e.g., trade or professional group restrictions on non-price competition) have
for the most part been marginal, though reflecting general trends in antitrust
of increased quantification and analytic rigor. Evolving legal standards
associated with rise of truncated rule of reason analyses, however, has de-
emphasized the need for upfront assessment of market definition and market
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power in many horizontal agreements cases and encouraged direct
consideration and quantification of competitive effects.
Advances in economics have had a healthy leavening effect on antitrust
attitudes about vertical restraints. This has been a gradual process beginning
with the seminal work of Spengler (1950), Bork (1978), and Telser (1960).
Largely coming on the heels of theoretical work, empirical research also
indicated that vertical restraints are generally efficient or competitively benign
(Cooper, Froeb, and O’Brien 2005; Lafontaine and Slade 2008). This evidence
has softened enforcement priors about vertical restraints. This is not the only
example of empirics catching up to theory. For example, recent empirical
research has contributed to the understanding of the actual likelihood of
welfare losses associated with patent hold-up (see, e.g., Galetovic, Haber, and
Levine 2015).
Economists’ work on vertical restraints has been especially important due
to its impact on the courts. This impact is evident beginning with Supreme
Court’s 1977 decision in Sylvania,2 which held that non-price vertical restraints
should be evaluated under a rule of reason, and in following decisions in
Monsanto3 and Sharp,4 both of which involved dealer termination claims. The
Court’s decisions in State Oil5 and Leegin6 are recent cases reflecting the
impact of economics on the legal treatment of vertical arrangements: they
respectively moved maximum and minimum RPM restrictions from the per se
illegal category to the more expansive rule of reason box. The courts are
clearly a conservative element in antitrust. The impact upon the courts of new
economic theory, techniques, methodologies, or empirics is often slow.
Economists wanting to affect antitrust policy fundamentally must be willing to
play the long game.
Recent monopolization cases generally involve vertical issues. Exclusionary
conduct, either outright exclusion or softer forms of exclusion with conditional
pricing contracts (e.g., market share or loyalty discounts), and tying are
typically the practices of concern in monopolization cases. Remedial goals are
typically limited to prohibiting these practices. Since the early 1980s, initiatives
to break up leading firms, though sometimes internally debated, were seldom
undertaken. Reluctance to subject very successful firms with structural re-
engineering suggests some recognition of the reality of dynamic competition in
which firms superior in satisfying buyer needs, or in reducing costs, grow
relative to rivals.
New game theoretic models have emerged since the 1990s that, among
other things, feature mechanisms to overcome traditional objections to
anticompetitive outcomes: the triangle loss problem in the case of exclusion
and the one monopoly rent critique in tying. New analyses of tying have
shifted the focus of competitive concerns to the tying good and away from the
tied good (see, e.g., Carlton and Waldman 2002). Overall, this body of work
has provided insights on the importance to competitive outcomes of strategic
incentives, contracting externalities, observability, commitment, and the
structure of the bargaining game. It has also furnished a more a
comprehensive theoretical basis for the possible efficiencies of vertical
restraints.
These models typically do not require detailed, upfront assessments of
market power. They invite direct examination of competitive effects, leaving
in-depth consideration of market definition and market power to later, and
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only if needed. But their predictions are often fragile. Welfare consequences
are often ambiguous. Outcomes are sensitive to assumptions about contracting,
first mover advantages, observability, beliefs, and the intensity of downstream
competition. Any assumption may or may not hold in real world cases
(O’Brien 2008). Validation of model predictions by reference to observables is
often limited. For example, quantifying efficiencies or the adverse scale effects
on targeted rivals is sometimes difficult, the latter especially so in rapidly
evolving markets.
In short, while advances in economics have promised increased precision in
merger analysis, there is less sense of this effect in the monopolization or the
vertical areas. Indeed, perplexity has arguably increased. Many of those
steeped in the relevant literature recognize these challenges (see, e.g.,
Ramseyer and Rasmusen 2014). This appreciation is not universal among
antitrust practitioners, some of whom rely on subjective priors and do not
sufficiently distinguish possibility from likelihood.
Assessment of the Performance of Antitrust
Economists also have assessed the performance of antitrust enforcement. A
great deal of attention has been devoted to merger retrospectives.
Retrospectives are valuable because they speak to whether enforcement has
been on target. They also help evaluate merger simulations and other new
analytical tools. Retrospectives can also motivate enforcement initiatives. For
example, retrospectives were instrumental in reviving the FTC enforcement
program in the hospital industry, a program that had stalled after litigation
defeats in the 1990s.
Current findings raise warning flags for antitrust enforcers. Ashenfelter,
Hosken, and Weinberg (2014) reviewed 49 merger retrospectives and
concluded that the evidence is overwhelming that mergers can cause
significant price increases. They also note some differences in the incidence of
positive merger price effects across industries (e.g., all airline merger studies
show price increases, but it is unclear whether consumer prices increased due
to petroleum industry mergers). John Kwoka’s recent book (2015) examined
published retrospectives of US mergers occurring between 1976 and 2006, a
sample somewhat overlapping that of Ashenfelter et al. Based on his meta-
analysis, Kwoka concluded antitrust enforcement generally did not prevent
price increases. Kwoka inferred that enforcement has been too lax and has
increasingly strayed off target. One likely culprit, in his view, is the relaxed
attitude toward traditional structural presumptions, specifically too little
attention to mergers with lower market shares and concentration measures.
The European Commission (EC) also recently released a review of merger
decisions in the EU (European Commission 2015). Based on retrospective
studies that estimated post-merger effects in 25 mergers occurring between
1995 and 2012, the EC study also found that, on average, price rose post
merger, especially in unchallenged transactions. The EC study found
magnitudes of post-merger price increases to be roughly comparable to
Kwoka’s for US mergers. The EC study found that market concentration was a
strong driver of the estimated merger price effects in its sample, which is
consistent with a view that market concentration has been receiving too little
weight in enforcement decisions.
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Yet, it is premature for an across-the-board enforcement course correction
or a return to old ways. The sample of examined mergers is small, is
concentrated in a few industries, and focuses on short run effects, possibly too
short a time for any efficiencies to be fully implemented. Additional
retrospectives and research may be informative about whether the nature of
market competition (e.g., price vs. quantity as strategic variable, the
significance of product differentiation and non-price competition, and buyer
characteristics) has something to do with observed effects. More retrospectives
on recent mergers would also shed light on whether the developments in
prospective merger analysis described above are really delivering increased
enforcement precision.
There are also alternative views about appropriate meta-analysis
methodology and what the current evidence is saying (Vita and Osinski
forthcoming). For example, the modal and median price increases in Kwoka’s
sample of retrospectives are very small. The retrospectives that we do have
also tell us mostly about Type II agency enforcement errors (not challenging
anticompetitive mergers), but little about Type I agency errors (challenging
benign or procompetitive mergers). This is because the overwhelming number
of examined mergers proceeded unchallenged, while the few that were
challenged eventually proceeded upon judicial review. There is a trade-off
between the two errors. Type II error could be much reduced if enforcement
returned to the days of Von’s Grocery,7 but few informed observers appear to
want that. If market concentration has something to do with retrospective
outcomes, what we would want to know is the trade-off between Type I and
Type II errors conditional on concentration.
More recent and future retrospectives may also be more reliable than
earlier ones. For example, the clustering of standard errors in retrospectives
using panel data is now more common (see, e.g., Bertrand, Duflo, and
Mullainathan 2004). The ongoing debate on the relative merits of reduced form
and structural approaches continue to inform merger retrospective analyses
(see, e.g., Angrist and Pischke 2010; Nevo and Whinston 2010). Some
economists have also proposed new approaches to important and challenging
issues, such as the endogeneity of mergers (Dafny 2009).
Economists have also given attention to non-merger enforcement. This
work has largely taken the form of case studies, ranging from those on the
great old cases, such as Standard Oil8, to more recent big cases such as
Microsoft.9 Modern economic assessment of these venerated icons is valuable
because past cases often serve as models and precedents. The impermanence
of seemingly entrenched market power and the challenges in designing
meaningful remedies are among the general lessons from these case studies.
There are opportunities for more assessments of conduct-related antitrust
outcomes. For example, the FTC’s many horizontal restraints cases involving
professional associations deserve attention.
A limited amount of work has focused on the benefits and costs of
antitrust. Writing in 2003, Baker summarized the then available evidence and
concluded that “almost surely” the consumer benefits of antitrust exceed
public and private expenditures related to enforcement (Baker 2003). This is
the prevailing view in the antitrust community, though not every economist
has been so sanguine (see, e.g., Crandall and Winston 2003). There is more
disagreement over whether enforcement margins are optimal.
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Researchers have ample reasons to undertake new cost–benefit centered
analyses of antitrust enforcement. There have been arguments that the
competitiveness of the US economy has changed one way or the other,
suggesting changing benefits from antitrust. The private and public costs of
antitrust investigations have clearly increased. Document submissions in
antitrust investigations, for example, have reached prodigious levels, a
phenomenon associated with rise of firms’ use of e-mail and electronic file
keeping. The courts’ standards on burden and proof have also changed
(Kolasky 2012): these changes have implications for costs and for likelihood of
enforcement errors. Firms’ strategic use of the antitrust and the role of private
enforcement deserve additional attention beyond that they have already
received (see, e.g., McAfee, Mialon, and Mialon 2008; Sokol 2012).
Economists also debated the welfare standard for antitrust enforcement,
this mostly for the mergers with the Williamson trade-off in view. One rough
estimate suggests that the choice between consumer and total welfare
standards significantly matters to the cost–benefit calculus (Huschelrath 2012).
Economists’ bottom lines on the appropriate standard are mixed. The issues
are well understood: how and if distributional effects should count, which
kind of cost savings should matter, the significance of costly rent-seeking, and
the ease of monitoring antitrust policy under alternative standards. The
consumer welfare standard presently faces little serious challenge in the US
Distributional issues, which resonate very strongly with non-economists,
continue to trump efficiency arguments.
A few countries do not have a pure consumer welfare standard. Canada’s
standard, for example, is a hybrid of the consumer and total welfare
standards. Distributional effects may be viewed as netting out in intermediate
product mergers upstream from final consumers. Study of enforcement
intensity, outcomes, and the nature of proposed transactions in these
jurisdictions may be informative to the debate about the antitrust welfare
standard.
Conclusion
Developments in economic theory and empirics, along with more data and
enhanced computational capabilities, have made antitrust analysis increasingly
complex and quantitative over the last quarter century. Competitive paradigms
have shifted. Some developments have promised increased clarity and
precision in enforcement, but others have added perplexities. Empirical
findings have also changed enforcement priors and examined the effectiveness
of antitrust performance. Theory and empirics have both been important in
reshaping antitrust. Of the two, the latter is the greater because true progress
in antitrust enforcement – as is the case in most areas of human endeavor –
depends critically on the ability and willingness to measure, and to measure
repeatedly.
Notes
1. Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 US 294 (1962).
2. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 US 36 (1977).
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3. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Svc. Corp., 465 US 752 (1984).
4. Bus. Electr. Corp. v. Sharp Electr. Corp., 485 US 717 (1988).
5. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 US 3 (1997).
6. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 US 877 (2007).
7. United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 US 270 (1966).
8. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 US 1 (1911).
9. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199 (DC Cir 2004).
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